Mobile ad hoc networks are self-creating, self-administering and self-organizing. A self-motivated set of mobile wireless users dynamically exchange data among themselves in the absence of a predetermined infrastructure and controller. Malicious nodes adversely affect the performance of the network. In this paper, we investigate the effect of salvaging routing reply (SRR) for AODV protocol in presence of malicious nodes. We have conducted extensive simulations using QualNet 4.5 network simulator to evaluate the performance of AODV-SRR. The studies show a significant improvement in performance as compared with that of conventional AODV protocol, with only nominal overheads.
envisioned for future military operations. Thus, Security is an important issue for these mission-critical applications.
In MANET, a number of prominent routing protocols have been proposed in the literature, to name a few, AODV [3] (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector), DSR [6] (Dynamic Source Routing), TORA (Temporarily Ordered Routing Algorithm), WRP (Wireless Routing Protocol) and ZRP (Zone Routing Protocol) [9] [10] . While DSR and AODV share the on-demand behavior in that they initiate routing activities only in the presence of data packets in need of a route, several of their routing mechanics are very different. In particular, DSR uses source routing, whereas AODV uses a table-driven routing framework and destination sequence numbers. DSR does not have any timer-based activities, while AODV has the same to a certain extent. In DSR, several additional optimizations, such as Salvaging, Gratuitous route repair and Promiscuous listening have been proposed and have been found to be very effective.
Our work rests on the fundamentals of an existing systemthe SRR (salvaging routing reply) [1] , proposed by Mekesh Singhal et al. as an extension to the Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector AODV Protocol. We briefly outline the philosophy of SRR.
The loss of route reply packets causes serious impairment of performance of AODV protocol. This is because route reply packets are obtained after flooding the entire network with RREQs. Mekesh Singhal et al have proposed and implemented the idea of salvaging route reply (SRR) for on demand routing protocols. The basic idea is illustrate in Fig.1 . Assume that, initially there exists no active path from source node S to destination node D. Node S is discovering a route to node D. Node D sends a RREP to node S, through intermediate nodes A, B, C and X. Node C cannot send the RREP to node B because B has moved away. Node C becomes the salvor, it saves the RREP message, and then it broadcasts a RREQ SRR . Node V receives the RREQ SRR and finds a route to the source node S in its routing table, so V sends a RREP SRR to C. C receives the RREP SRR and successfully salvages the original RREP by sending it along the path discovered by SRR. It can use the new alternative route to send RREP packets to node S, through intermediate nodes A, U, V and C. Then the return path after SRR is D-X-C-V-U-A-S. Route maintenance deals with routing information at nodes, typically involving three possible operations: handling route errors, deleting stale route entries, and learning new routes from the traffic.
With ubiquitous presence of malicious nodes, it is of interest to know how SRR behaves in the presence of malicious nodes. In this paper, we have investigated the effect of salvaging routing reply (SRR) in the presence of malicious nodes. We have conducted extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of SRR. The results show that SRR improves t he performance of AODV protocol A Study on Salvaging Route Reply for AODV Protocol in the Presence of Malicious Nodes Ayyaswamy Kathirvel, Member, ISTE Rengaramanujam Srinivasan, Member, ISTE, FIE significantly as compared with that of conventional AODV protocol, with only nominal overheads. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: S ection 2 describes the simulation model using QualNet 4.5; Section 3 gives an analysis of results; related work is reviewed in the section 4, while Section 5 draws up conclusions.
II. SIMULATION MODEL
We use a simulation model based on QualNet 4.5 in our evaluation [11] . Our performance evaluations are based on the simulations of 100 wireless mobile nodes that form a wireless ad hoc network over a rectangular (1500 X 600 m) flat space. The MAC layer protocol used in the simulations was the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11. The parameter settings are given in Table I .
Before the simulation we randomly selected a certain fraction, ranging from 0 % to 40 % of the network population as malicious nodes. We considered only two types of attacksmodifying the hop count and dropping packets. Each flow did not change its source and destination for the lifetime of a simulation run. For all our studies we had kept the simulation time as 900 s.
We have done three sets of studies using AODV protocol and modified AODV protocol called as AODV-SRR. Set 1 corresponds to routing misbehavior of malicious nodes. In Set 1 malicious nodes give false hop counts. Set 2 corresponds to packet forwarding misbehavior, where malicious nodes deliberately drop data packets and Set 3 simulates a combination of both routing and packet forwarding misbehaviors.
The three performance metrics used by us are as follows: Packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the data packets successfully, delivered to the destinations to those generated by the CBR sources. Average end-to-end delay, It is the average time taken for a packet to be transmitted across a network from source to destination. It includes transmission delay, propagation delay and processing delay. Communication overhead is the total number of control packets sent by routing protocols in order to achieve its goal. 
A. Packet Delivery Ratio
In the world of MANET, packet delivery ratio has been accepted as a standard measure of throughput. We present the packet delivery ratios of plain AODV and AODV-SRR, for malicious node percentages of 0, 10, 20, 30 and 40, with node mobility varying between 0 to 20 m/s. In general, in the absence of malicious nodes both routing protocols (plain AODV and AODV-SRR) have got good packet delivery ratio. In the absence of malicious nodes Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 have identical results and are presented in Fig. 2 .
In the case of plain AODV, with 0% malicious nodes, packet delivery ratio decreases from 98.28 %, when the nodes are stationary to 93.73 %, when the nodes are moving at 20 m/s. corresponding figures AODV-SRR are 99.18 % and 94.98.
From the results of the Set 1 (Fig. 3 ) the following conclusions can be drawn: Table II ) the following conclusions can be drawn:
We observe that the identical results for both plain AODV and AODV-SRR this is because the following reason. AODV-SRR takes care of the failure of RREP packets only. Thus SRR mechanism is not be helpful if the data packets are intentionally dropped. From results of Set 3 (Fig.4 ) the following conclusions can be drawn: 1) In set 3 simulates misbehavior of malicious nodes in both data forwarding and route reply. Accordingly the performance improvement is lower than that of set 1.
The actual performance improvement depends upon ratio of two the types of malicious nodes. 
B. Communication overhead
Communication overhead can be evaluated based on the number of transmissions of control messages like RREQ, RREP, RERR in the case of plain AODV and in addition RREQ SRR , RREP SRR in the AODV-SRR. RREQ are to be decimated to the entire network, where as RREP messages are unicasts. We have taken appropriate weights for each message. For example the count of RREP message from destination to source will be k where k is the hop count. We present the communication overhead details for 0% malicious nodes in Fig. 5 of plain AODV and AODV-SRR. Again in the absence of malicious nodes Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 have got identical communication overhead.
From results of Set 1 (Fig. 6 ), Set 2 ( Table 2) and Set 3 (Fig. 7.) following inferences can be drawn: 1)
The communication overhead increases with increasing percentage of malicious nodes.
2)
In the case of AODV (Set 1), with 10% malicious nodes, communication overhead increases from 1.11, when the nodes are stationary to 1.32, when the nodes are moving at 20 m/s as shown in the Fig. 6 . Whereas AODV-SRR with same percentage malicious nodes, communication overhead has reduced values of 1.02 ( 0 m/s ) and 1.21 ( 20 m/s ).
3) We observe that the identical communication overhead for set 2 of both plain AODV and AODV-SRR as given in the Table 2 . The communication overhead has a steep rise from 9046 (0 % malicious nodes, mobility = 0 m/s) to 20732 (40 % malicious nodes, mobility = 20 m/s).
4)
For Set 3 of plain AODV, the increases from 1.22 (10% malicious nodes; mobility = 0) to 1.91 (40% malicious nodes and mobility = 20 m/s) as shown in the Fig. 7 . The corresponding values for AODV-SRR are 1.08 and 1.69. find that the decrease in communication overhead is 11 % as compared with plain AODV. 6) Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Table 2 provides a comparison of increase in communication overheads for plain AODV and AODV-SRR corresponding from 10% to 40% malicious nodes of Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3. We find that there is a reduction in communication overhead with plain AODV. 7) The communication overhead has a steep rise from 12371 (10 % malicious nodes, mobility = 0 m/s) to 20732 (40 % malicious nodes, mobility = 20 m/s). 
C. 3.3 End-to-end delay
In absence of malicious nodes with varying speed, both AODV and AODV-SRR protocols in the case of Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 have got identical end to end delay as shown in the Fig. 8 . 1) In the case of plain AODV (Set 1), with 10% malicious nodes, end to end delay increases from 2.64, when the nodes are stationary to 6.93, when the nodes are moving at 20 m/s. Corresponding figures for AODV-SRR are 1.72 and 5.90. 2) We observe that the identical end-to-end delay for set 2 of both plain AODV and AODV-SRR as given in the Table II . iii. For Set 3 of plain AODV, the increases from 3.15 (10% malicious nodes; mobility = 0) to 7.54 (40% malicious nodes and mobility = 20 m/s) as shown in the Fig. 10 . The corresponding variation for AODV-SRR is from 2.10 to 6.31.
IV. RELATED WORK
Many approaches have been proposed to improve the performance of reactive routing protocols. Some approaches have been beneficial to most of the reactive routing protocols. Expanding ring search optimization has been proposed for AODV protocol [2] [3] [4] [5] [8-10]. Since RREQ packets are flooded throughout the network; this algorithm does not scale well to large networks. If the destination node is located relatively near the source, issuing a RREQ packet that potentially pass through every node in the network is wasteful. The source node searches successively larger areas until the destination node is found. This is done by, for every RREQ retransmission until a route is found, incrementing the time to live (TTL) value carried in every RREQ packet, thus expanding the ``search ring'' in which the source is centered. DSR have three optimization mechanisms (i.e) Salvaging: An intermediated node uses an alternative route from its cache, when a data packet meets a failed link on its source route. Gratuitous Route Repair: A Source node receiving RERR piggybacks the RERR in the following RREQ, to clean the caches of other nodes that may use the failed link. Promiscuous Listening: When a node overhears a packet not addressed to itself, it checks whether the packet could be routed via itself to gain a shorter route. If so, sends a gratuitous RREP to S with a better new route [6] [7] .
Path optimizing [12] [13] approaches typically require nodes to work in promiscuous mode to find an optimization opportunity. Route caches are used to reduce the overhead of route discovery. DSR uses routing cache aggressively, and maintains multiple routes per destination [9] [10] .
Adaptive Hello Rate (AHR), a two-state adaptive mechanism for adjusting HELLO_INTERVAL parameter in AODV. They have used two states: high Hello rate and low Hello rate. They have potential benefit [2] [5] . In the paper [14] when a path is likely to be broken, a warning is sent to the source indicating the likelihood of a disconnection.
V. CONCLUSION
We have conducted simulation studies to evaluate the performance of AODV-SRR in the presence of malicious nodes and have compared it with plain AODV routing protocol. The results show that AODV-SRR significantly improves the performance of AODV in all metrics, namely, packet delivery ratio, control overhead and end-to-end delay. Our future work will focus on studying the design of SRR for other major on-demand routing protocols and studying t heir respective performance improvements.
